Turning first to the primary, dynamic elements of proximal needs, ego strength, affective and instrumental involvement and marginality:

H_{10} Socialists will have weaker egos, as measured by the Ego Strength Scale, more proximal needs, as measured by the Proximal/Distal Perception Scale, more marginal, as measured by the Marginality Scale, and more affectively involved, as measured by the Moral/Instrumental Involvement Scale, than Republicans, Democrats, New Conservatives and Control Group. Accept.

Three of these hypotheses have already been confirmed. With respect to the hypothesis about affective involvement, analysis of variance indicates that the means of the groups differ significantly by rejection of the null hypothesis at the .001 level:

Sources of Variation	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Between Groups	54.03	4	13.50	4.02
Within Groups	174.52	52	3.35	
Total	228.55	56		

Ranking

Socialists	18.00	(Hi)
Control	17.40	
Democrats	17.00	
Republicans	16.00	
Conservatives	15.76	(Lo)
Group Mean	16.89	

Limiting our discussion for the moment to these variables, idealogical involvement is a combined operant-respondent generated by external and internal stimuli fed through a particular personality type. Part of the responsibility has been assigned to the weakness of the ego; ego weakness severely constrains reality testing and the sophisticated value manipulation required for effective action. The conjunction of marginality and ego weakness triggers a need for proximal gratifications. Proximal gratifications are more likely to be found in the culture of an idealogical group than in any other form of political activity. The Socialist's range of personal contacts are limited because other people recognize that they may incur costs from social colleagues if they engage in interaction with them. Being disliked is a powerful source of cohesiveness for a deviant group; it assures that there will be a more intensive exchange of values than would be the case if distal environments were available. Although we posit a significant and positive relationship between marginality and proximal needs, the two must be regarded as independent events. That is to say, marginality is an environmental condition that the organism, because of its ego weakness,

general cognitive congruity at the primitive belief level with the views espoused by the idealogical group, (2) a peripheral model of political reality that produces the conclusion that certain forms of political behavior are more rational than others, and (3) political motives. All three fall under the second and third categories of testable propositions.

H_{11} Socialists possess a general cognitive congruity at the primitive belief level with the views espoused by the Socialist Club. Accept.

Congnitive congruity means a rough coherence between the organism's primitive beliefs and the doctrines advanced by the organization. In a broad sense, although definitions of this sort are risky, we mean liberalism, or a set of beliefs which sees man as basically good, as the victim of aversive conditions, as capable of rational self-management and management of the environment to produce a better life. The open-ended interviews indicate that the members of the club were not only well schooled in the details of the Socialist myth and policy alternatives, but were also liberal. It is hypothesized that the general attitude toward liberalism had been created by prior socialization in primary or secondary settings, and that the development of the Socialist myth as a model of how things ought to be was a

result of careful building on liberal primitive beliefs as part of the group socialization process. All respondents admitted that they knew little of Socialist mythology prior to joining, but had liberal convictions, most often based upon religious training. Since our proposition is developmental, and concerns relationships prior to actual affiliation, there are no accurate tests for it. Ours, the reader is reminded, is a single time observation during a period in which all respondents had been members of the club for six months or more. Any continuity must be assumed from theory. Primitive beliefs do not change, and where they do, the pace of change is imperceptible. If this is the case, we should be able to tap the content of beliefs formed in the past by observations in the present. Admittedly, it is risky, but under the circumstances, necessary. If a person, our theory holds, has liberal primitive beliefs now, he acquired them in the past. Analysis of variance indicates, with respect to liberal primitive beliefs in the nature of society, the groups compared differ significantly at the .005 level:

Sources of Variation	Sums of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Between Groups	455.15	4	114.78	2.70
Within Groups	2,172.81	52	41.78	
Total	2,627.96	56		

Ranking

Socialists	20.10	(Hi)
Democrats	16.50	
Control	15.00	
Conservatives	14.00	
Republicans	13.70	(Lo)
Group Mean	15.86	

The dimension of primitive beliefs in the nature of society was measured by the following four item Likert-type Attitude Scale:

1. Class distinctions in society are essential because they take account of the natural differences in men.
2. The purpose of society is to protect man from his own evil impulses.
3. It is only natural that the superior classes in society should rule.

4. Most of society's taboos are too strict.[23]

Another scale, measuring liberal primitive beliefs in the nature of man did not reveal significant differences among the groups.

Again, we still do not have a sufficient account of the choice of a deviant political group over a legitimate political group. Liberalism could just as easily have disposed any of our respondents to the Republican or Democratic Parties. I think the respondent's model of the polity made part of the difference.

H_{12} Socialists possess a populist model of polity. Accept.

It is the author's contention that the models of the polity held by Americans fall into one of three groups (or some permutation thereof): populist, madisonian and empirical. Let us define:

populist model df a peripheral model of empirical reality which views the polity in the following manner: (1) the best government is one in which the

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[23]With previous samples, this scale had a Kuder-Richardson Reliability Coefficient of .895, and with this sample, a reproducibility coefficient of .85.

people alone are sovereign, (2) in which all people share equal power, (3) in which the best technique of policy is majority rule or preference, (4) in which the people have the last say. Implied beliefs include (5) man is basically good and rational, (6) that persuasion, or the changing of beliefs through reason is the most legitimate and efficient use of activity.[24]

madisonian model df a model of empirical reality which views the polity in the following manner: (1) because man is basically evil, all men are motivated to deprive others of their natural rights, (2) the best defense against minority factions and majority factions is a republic organized around the principle of the equal division of power among the various branches and levels of government and among the levels of government and the people.[25]

empirical model df a model of empirical reality which views the polity in the following manner:

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[24]Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), Chapter 2.

[25]Ibid., Chapter 1.

(1) because man is neither good nor evil, but merely self-interested, the best system of government is one which maximizes the distribution of values as preferred by the members of the polity, (2) the best organization to realizing this goal is a pluralistic democracy in which the principles of organization are maximized through elite rule and the principle of self interest is maximized through influence by those of lower power and status upon those of higher power and status, and (3) manipulation is an acceptable means to value acquisition.

If we hold motivation constant, and vary the model of the polity, we would produce varying behavioral outcomes. Given political motivation, the populist is led to the conclusion that the best way to affect events is to aggregate supporting majorities by changing minds or convincing the uncommitted; the madisonian concludes that control of resources and persistent opposition to change are the best stratagems; the empiricist concludes that policy can be produced in a variety of ways, that the resources of power are seldom fixed, and that through efficient manipulation, he may be able to realize some of his own preferences. The populist

would be, given this conclusion, expected to affiliate with groups oriented to persuasion through the production and dissemination of propaganda. The madisonian would be inclined to select organizations devoted to the obstruction of any change in the allocation of values and costs: in the south, the Democratic party and almost anywhere else, the rural Republican party. The empiricist would be drawn to whichever organization he perceived as being able to best maximize his opportunities for gaining power.

In terms of general sophistication and political discrimination, the populist is lowest, followed by the madisonian. The empiricist is highest.

Theoretically, we may account for the failure to test an incorrect model of the polity by reference to one of two factors: (1) there was no real need to test it, (2) where the need to test it existed, the structural impediment of a weak ego intervened to block access to pertinent, testable information. Analysis of variance data already reported shows that the Socialists did have the weakest ego development when compared with the other groups. The open-ended interviews, based on the interpretive reading of responses by the author, revealed that the Socialists were predominantly

consistent populists; six were definite populists, two were madisonians, one was an empiricist, and the other was a permutation with heavy populist leanings. The Control Group also displayed a relatively homogeneous populist syndrome. Why? Following our prior analysis, we will assume that the Socialists were politically motivated and needed to test their populist models of the polity, but could not because of ego weakness. The Control Group, on the other hand, had no political motivation, and therefore, had no need to test their populist models. If a member of the Control Group did acquire political motives, he would then have occasion to test his populist model; over time, the model would mutate to either a madisonian or an empirical model. The analysis suggests that in the Northwest, populism is the consensual, socially approved model of civic culture transmitted to everyone socialized in the public school system. Although the Republicans and Democrats had a higher number of permutations, both tended to have more empiricists than any of the other groups and fewer consistent populists and madisonians. The New Conservatives exhibited no definite pattern. It is worth noting that the Socialists exhibited greater homogeneity in their populist models than

any of the other groups. Not only did they have the most consistent belief patterns, but the models had more in common than the models of any other group. Thus, the populist model of Socialist X, aside from having more logically related belief patterns than any other models, had more in common with the populist model of Socialist Y than the empirical model of Democrat A had in common with the empirical model of Democrat B. The relative purity and homogeneity of the Socialist's models indicates the effects of intensive socialization within a deviant group. In short, some attempt was made to test models, but the closed nature of the group led to reinforcement of the populist model.

The final, and perhaps crucial question which must now be answered involves the presence or absence of political motives in the Socialists:

H_{13} The Socialists were politically motivated. Accept.

Previously, we defined a motive as an orientation to action which effectively aggregated a number of needs efficiently in terms of gratification. A political motive, for example, might provide lucrative employment, social prestige, power, recognition, free range to sexual desires, and so on.

Unfortunately, this definition would have required an array of measuring instruments which we could not have employed except at the risk of alienating our respondents. To have presented people already suspicious of the intent of social science research with ink blot tests and other projective questionnaires could have been the straw that broke the respondent's willingness to continue the interview sessions. We will assume that the act of joining an organization with political purposes is prima facie evidence of political motivation, even though a host of other needs might have been involved. Certainly, we must accept the notion of multiple motivation. For example, one Socialist joined because of a close affective link with the club's secretary. Another, the wife of the nominal leader and past President of the club, made a dramatic conversion from fundamentalist religion to Socialism under the skilled tutoring of her husband. When asked about ideal career choices, all Socialists nominated high elective office, with responses equally divided between the United States Senate and the Presidency. Acknowledging the ideal, and unrealistic, character of their choices, most had elected, as a real career choice, an academic career. But there was an unmistakable preference for political life. Several

respondents, for example, visualized an academic career as an opening to politics. Another believed that the academic community would provide a safe place in which to express unpopular views freely. Ideal career choices in the other clubs were much less political and more oriented toward the arts, literature, and the professions, while real choices ran to business, management, law and medicine. Among the Republicans and Democrats, law was a dominant choice among male respondents.

Now, we may turn our attention to the last, but perhaps the most universally important factor in all affiliation choice: interpersonal influence. The process of interpersonal control is present in practically every case of individual choice. One impetus for affiliation comes from a motive, but the critical factor that accompanies it is the demands of others, processed through authority or influence.

H_{14} Among Socialists, the decision to affiliate with the Socialist Club was partially a function of interpersonal influence. Accept.

The open-ended interviews revealed that most of the Socialists affiliated with the Socialist Club at the invitation of a close friend, a casual friend or a classmate. In other words, the initial act of attending a club meeting was a

function of a deferent exchange from a request made by another person. In fact, with the exception of several cases in the Democratic Club, interpersonal influence appears to be a universal factor in affiliational choice. In the Control Group, for example, the major criteria for taking an introductory course in Oceanography were (1) the need for a three credit course to fulfill a science requirement, and (2) the recommendation of a friend or an acquaintance that it would be, to use the colloquial expression, a "snap." All of the New Conservatives joined at the bidding of friends or parents. Returning to the Socialists for a moment, two respondents exhibited the effects of negative influence, in the form of an absolute probibition against involvement emanating from their fathers.

Discussion

The static second approximation has become a dynamic, developmental model. It states that idealogical involvement as a specific form of affiliational choice, is a function of the internal state of the organism, including weak ego, proximal needs, affective involvement, liberal primitive beliefs, political motives and a populist model of the polity, interacting with environmental stimuli called

marginality and a positive or negative interpersonal influence. Schematically, if we add a time dimension, the model takes this form:

Figure 5.6

Time	Stimulus	Internal State of the Organism	Response
1	stability →	ego weakness and low psychodynamic integration →	follows existing pattern
2	marginality →	ego weakness and low psychodynamic integration →	evocation of proximal needs
3	marginality + proximal needs →	moral involvement →	selection of politics, academe and religion
4	marginality + proximal needs →	liberalism →	selection of liberal politics, academe, or religion
5	marginality + proximal needs →	political motivation →	selection of liberal politics
6	marginality + proximal needs →	populist model of polity →	liberal, legitimate politics liberal, deviant politics
7	marginality + proximal needs + interpersonal influence →		Communists CORE Socialists

Developmentally, the organism has acquired a weak ego, liberal primitive beliefs, and a disposition to moral involvement in earlier socialization settings. His existing condition of stability represents a satisfactory synthesizing of all of these factors and the environment. Suddenly, marginality is induced, which leads the organism in search of a new, proximal setting. The new stimulus produces an interest in groups that generate proximal values, including the opportunity to nurture others and to receive succorance, authority and intense exchange of affection. The processes of selection begin with the most general personality trait or characteristic, with each subsequent alternative being systematically determined by a less general trait. First, marginality and ego weakness generate proximal needs, and these, in turn, become a second powerful stimulus for idealogical involvement. The correctness of our decision to link ego strength and marginality was borne out by an unexpected correlation between them, such that <u>the weaker the ego, the more marginal</u>.

Group	df	r	Hypothesis: p = 0
Socialists	8	-.85921	Rejected, above .005
Control	8	-.55905	Rejected, above .050
Republicans	8	-.44343	Not rejected, less than .10
Conservatives	11	-.16577	Not rejected, less than .10
Democrats	12	.06160	Not rejected, less than .10

The following scattergram indicates the strength of the correlation:

Figure 5.7



Second, with marginality (external stimulus) and proximal needs (internal stimulus) constant, affective involvement orients the organism to a psychological field where morality can be practiced without cost: politics, academe and religion. Third, liberalism selects the liberal wing of

morality. Fourth, political motives select out politics. Fifth, a populist model of the polity selects, within politics, persuasive activity as opposed to manipulative activity. Finally, with the choice narrowed to liberal, deviant (persuasive) politics, the organism is ready for involvement. But without the final push of interpersonal influence, this individual probably could not take the step for himself. In short, whichever group gets to him first, gets him body and soul. In this case, it was a Socialist, but it could easily have been a member of any other group.

The evidence for the model is insufficient to test it, for two reasons: (1) the model was reconstructed from the surviving data, and (2) it is developmental and sequential, rendering any data from a single time observation supportive, but irrelevant. Our data was drawn from a single time observation. The utility of the model can be found in its ability to impose an understandable set of relationships on what would otherwise be a set of random events. We have no way of being certain that the process is as mechanical as we have represented it. The model makes sense, and it accounts for some data. Beyond this, nothing can be said.

Summary

The specific dynamic of idealogical affiliation is a manifestation of a more general and universal process of decision-making. The model of choice evolved from my findings has the following shape:

Figure 5.8

		Organismic	Environmental
		involvement type	
		needs	
		motives	degree of environmental stability
choice	f	primitive beliefs	
		peripheral models	interpersonal influence
		ego strength	

Thus,

1) involvement type disposes the organism toward the most general range of value markets:

   a) the more affective the involvement, the higher the probability of choosing value markets which permit acquisition of sentiments that define absolute, universal goodness, truth or beauty;

   b) the more instrumental the involvement, the higher the

probability of choosing value markets that permit the acquisition of specific, ascriptive, immediately gratifying physical artifacts (such as food, money, sex, etc.);

2) needs dispose the organism to select, within a general market, a more specific value setting:

a) the more proximal the needs, the higher the probability of selecting proximal settings;

b) the more distal the needs, the higher the probability of selecting distal settings;

3) motives determine the selection of the specific market or the particular role within a market:

a) a political or power motive will lead to the selection of a political market or a political role within any market;

4) salience and content of primitive beliefs dispose an organism to select the value market in which the greatest number of reinforcements are available for primitive beliefs:

a) the stronger and more liberal the primitive beliefs, the greater the probability of selecting a group which distributes liberal doctrines;

b) the stronger and more conservative the primitive beliefs, the greater the probability of selecting a

group which distributes conservative doctrines;

5) peripheral models determine selection of the particular value market from those already chosen:

a) if a populist model, the market will be one that specializes in discussion, persuasion and propaganda;

b) if a madisonian model, the market will be one that specializes in the defense of special interests;

c) if an empirical model, the market will be one that specializes in influence, manipulation and authority;

6) ego strength determines the degree of psychodynamic integration:

a) the stronger the ego, the greater the psychodynamic integration;

b) the greater the psychodynamic integration, the higher the probability of accurate model testing, efficiency and rationality;

c) the greater the psychodynamic integration, the greater the probability of successful value acquisition;

d) the greater the psychodynamic integration, the higher the probability of selecting value markets consensually identified as legitimate;

7) the degree of environmental stability determines the salience of proximal needs:

a) the greater the marginality, the more salient the proximal needs;

b) the more salient the proximal needs, the higher the probability of selecting a proximal market;

8) ego strength determines the relative openness of the perceptual aperture:

a) the stronger the ego, the greater the resistance to marginality;

b) the stronger the ego, the higher the probability that reality testing will yield a madisonian or an empirical model of the polity;

c) if a madisonian or empirical model of the polity exists, the probability will be high that the organism will choose legitimate political activity;

9) interpersonal influence determines the final act of affiliation:

a) the stronger the interpersonal influence, the higher the probability of controlled affiliation.

Each of these variables has a direct role in the act of affiliation, either in preparing the organism internally for a specific kind of choice, or in forcing a particular affiliational response. Thus,

Figure 5.9

		moral involvement	
		proximal needs	marginality
		political motive	
cialist filiation	= f	strong, liberal beliefs	existence of Socialist Club
		populist model	interpersonal influence to join
		weak ego	

altering several variables (underlined), the quality of
he affiliational response can be altered grossly:

Figure 5.10

		moral involvement	
		proximal needs	marginality
		religious motive (eternal salvation)	existence of Jehovah Witness church
ehovah Witness ffiliation	= f	strong, conservative belief	
		populist model	interpersonal influence by Jehovah Witness
		weak ego	

he strong, conservative primitive belief system and a re-
ligious motive could dispose the organism toward involvement
with a fundamentalist religious group. In effect, an

Figure 5.9

		moral involvement	
		proximal needs	marginality
		political motive	existence of Socialist Club
Socialist Affiliation	= f	strong, liberal beliefs	interpersonal influence to join
		populist model	
		weak ego	

By altering several variables (underlined), the quality of the affiliational response can be altered grossly:

Figure 5.10

		moral involvement	
		proximal needs	marginality
		religious motive (eternal salvation)	existence of Jehovah Witness church
Jehovah Witness Affiliation	= f	strong, conservative belief	interpersonal influence by Jehovah Witness
		populist model	
		weak ego	

The strong, conservative primitive belief system and a religious motive could dispose the organism toward involvement with a fundamentalist religious group. In effect, an

idealogue, no matter what his affiliation, has much in common with the highly religious person who affiliates with a religious group.

A Theory of Leadership

Leadership refers to the disproportional modification of human activity authoritatively through the management of values in ways that enhance the coordination, integration and efficiency of aggregate activity. The need for leadership arises from two sources: the absence of reliability in human behavior and human cussedness. Among the factors of production and rule, man is the least stable, and the least predictable. And because human beings monopolize the most vital of all management resources, compliance, they also have the capacity to influence productive activity in detrimental ways. The problem of leadership is to make human responses more predictable and reliable, and to mobilize the necessary amounts of compliance to complete group tasks. Successful leadership rests on three factors: the formal "clerkship" available to the leader, his "public prestige," and his "professional reputation."[26] The clerkship

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[26]Neustadt, Chapters 1, 4 and 5.

is the sum of the formal values which may be employed to elicit compliance. Public prestige refers to the leader's rank within a community of observers. Professional reputation identifies the consensual perception of those who comply with leadership demands about the general effectiveness and credibility of the leader.

The dynamics of leadership are simple: (1) those up and down the formal and informal hierarchy of the group control the implementation of leadership decisions--the problem of leadership is to encourage their compliance; (2) compliance is achieved through manipulation of the values of the clerkship--the leader must bargain for compliance; (3) public prestige rests upon the degree of esteem the leader has acquired within the community encompassed by the system--only if his public prestige is high can a leader discourage opposition to his program; (4) professional reputation is contingent upon the eminence and credibility a leader has gained on the basis of successful leadership in the past--if those who must comply believe that a leader will ultimately have his way anyhow and that he means business when he threatens sanctions for disobedience, the probability of their compliance increases; (5) public prestige, or popular support, determines how

requires the mobilization of compliance, and compliance rests on authority: leadership is therefore gained indirectly by the investment of informal authority. Informal authority, it will be recalled, depends upon esteem, which, in turn, is based on the amount of rewarding activity the person acquiring it can emit to those investing it. According to Bass, leadership

> is also accomplished by initiating structure--making others more able to overcome the obstacles thwarting goal attainment. Activities include instructing, supervising, informing, ordering and deciding.[27]

Leadership is won in the process of acquiring esteem: it is retained by constantly rewarding compliance. The moment a leader's suggestions, commands or requests produce punishment or lack of rewards when obeyed, at that moment the leader's esteem begins to dwindle, and with it his authority. The erosion of authority means an end to compliance, and as a result, an end to leadership. On the other hand, when leadership is successful, the word gets around, and the public prestige and professional reputation begin to grow. The larger the professional reputation, the more

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[27]Bernard Bass, Leadership, Psychology and Organizational Behavior (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 448.

deeply the leader may move into the strategic areas of the social management system.

However, not everyone has the capacity to generate esteem because few people want to lead and even fewer are perceptive enough to make accurate suggestions about how to complete group tasks that would elevate esteem. Leadership is partly a function of two sets of personality factors, one general and the other specific. The general factors are those which incline a person to take advantage of situations requiring leadership, to make the right decisions and to successfully implement them most of the time. These include high intelligence, leadership needs and motives, manipulative motives and skills, mild psychopathy and paranoia, empirical models of reality that are consistently open to change, and a strong ego. Specific factors include peculiar needs, motives, models of reality and skills which are particularly appropriate to a group's situation.

General Leadership Factors

The proposition that leaders are the most intelligent members of any group might raise the eyebrows of the run-of-the-mill social critic who believes that leaders,

especially politicians, are fools and idiots. What the social critic means is that he disagrees with the values of the leader and, in a sense, these values are unethical or immoral. Of course, the social critic assumes the existence of some absolute moral system against which the "intelligence" of human values may be judged. Intelligence, in the context of this work, has nothing to do with how well human values approximate absolute moral systems, but rather with the amount of understanding that can be brought to bear on the problems of internal and external adaptation and adjustment of the group. Intelligence refers to the capacity to adapt and adjust, a definition that places the dogmatic (and unadjustable) social critic at the bottom of the rank order of intelligence. However, the leader cannot be grossly more intelligent than his followers.[28]

Because people interact only to acquire values, the leader must get some positive gratification out of leading. Groups generally invest leadership in people who do something very rewarding for the group as a whole. By their

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[28]Cecil Gibb, "Leadership," Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Gardner Lindzey (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. II.

nature, groups are apt to find two things rewarding: (1) the completion of group tasks, and (2) the maintenance of internal solidarity. These two factors would tend to select persons for leadership with nurturance, dominance, achievement, counteraction and competence needs. Nurturance can be gratified by helping others; dominance, by controlling others; achievement, by completing tasks; counteraction, by overcoming difficult problems; competence, by excellence of performance. The ability to distribute internal solidarity indicates the ability to manipulate expressive symbols, supported by a need for play. Since all activities of a group must be carried out through structured processes, both order and construction needs may be present in the average leader's need system.

Existence of a leadership motive would seem to be essential in binding the need system of the leader to the value environment of the leadership role. Leadership also requires manipulation, which requires manipulative motivation, supported by manipulative skill traits. These include artful impression management in both the political and civic cultures, expertise in the manipulation of symbols, and a disposition to treat interaction in terms of gaming strategy. Cognitively, manipulation also requires selective presentation

and withdrawal of values without any consideration of their intrinsic worth, but only for their effect on behavior. At one time, a leader may employ sentiments of disapproval to induce ego weakness; another time, the same sentiment may be employed in the fabrication of an image. The capacity to view values and other persons as instruments to be manipulated in the policy implementation process would seem to require a certain detachment, something generated appropriately by mild psychopathy. Psychopathy in mild form is functional because it allows the leader to view other people in a manner that makes it easier for him to manage them. The greater the use of people as instruments of coercion, violence and terror, the greater the need for psychopathy.

Since the leader frequently operates in both the civic and political cultures, his capacity to control his own behavior to fit the situation must be relatively high. This would require a strong ego. His primary strategy in dealing with his followers is to reinforce their beliefs, or to structure syllogisms that will lead gullible minds to conclusions not expressed on the record. Or, he may indulge in issue inversion, in which he skillfully combines hard-headed realities with the requirements of the idealism of

the civic culture.[29] In private settings, a sense of paranoia is vital to protect him against the hunger of the powerseekers. He must perceive every powerseeker as a potential successor, and deal with each accordingly. The leader is open perceptually because his world is among the most uncertain in the existence. The relatively free exchange of reality testing information that characterizes other value markets does not exist in the leadership arena. The successful leader grows to depend upon a kind of extrasensory perception, in the form of exaggerated neurogenic and cognitive needs to aid him in testing models in the absence of hard information. Where leadership is competitive, information is scarce, and the difficulty of testing reality compounded. The leader compensates for the scarcity of information by becoming pathologically attuned to situational demands. Because political and civic settings operate according to different normative rules the leader who wishes to survive must have the capacity to deal with the manifest conflict

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[29]Lincoln won the Presidency by shrewdly asserting that the fate of the free labor system which kept the American class system permeable rested on the abolition of slavery. He thus gained the support of the Northern abolitionists and the Northern lower class working man who was anti-negro, but feared the extension of slavery to whites in the North. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), Chapter 5.

Specialized Leadership Factors

Specialized personality traits associated with leadership depend upon the specific character of the situation, that is to say, the specific problem faced at a given time by a social system. Peculiar problems demand the answers of specialized leadership. Two kinds of problems are common: genetic difficulties, which emerge from the general problems of aggregate life, and developmental problems, which arise as a social system moves through a particular stage or makes the transition from one stage to another. Among the genetic difficulties one finds problems in the performance of primary and secondary functions. If, at the primary level, the allocation of stability is problematic, a leader with a rather specific set of attitudes toward reality would be required--perhaps a person who, at the primitive belief level, places a high value on the transmission of societal values to succeeding generations or on the control of deviants. A generative need would be required for the former and a rejection need for the latter. In short, not every leader is capable of mobilizing resources for socialization or social control. Where the allocation of work is problematic, a person who values social justice

may be more capable of providing leadership than a person who does not.

Developmental problems also require specialized leadership talents. The period of solidarity in small groups requires the services of an expressive leader; in a nation, a charismatic hero (Washington, Mao, Lenin, Sukarno) would be necessary. Expressive or charismatic leadership seems to involve idealization of the leader by followers, and the projection of an image of flamboyance and aggressive toughness. These two qualities are well suited to programs of cohesion based upon hatred of an external enemy. Once the period of solidarity has been placed on a sound footing, power might pass to a more withdrawn, but politically skillful autocrat (Bismarck, Jackson, Stalin, Franco) who can see the process of homogenization through to completion. All transitional leaders, because they are revolutionary, tend to be charismatic, but also possess specialized traits which orient them to skillful management of the problems of the period during which they rule. The period of accelerated adaptation might be brought into existence by a charismatic entrepreneur (Lincoln, Khrushchev); the stage may be brought to fruition by a

bureaucratically oriented manager (Kosygin-Brezhnev, Wilson, Hoover). The stage of distributive integration could be ushered in by a charismatic patrician (Roosevelt); the period could be tutored to maturity by a neurocrat capable of dealing with the conflicts inherent in maintaining economic growth and at the same time promoting distributive justice on the basis of non-economic incentives (Kennedy, Johnson).[30] The stage of advanced bureaucratization could be produced by a flexible executive (Defense Secretary Robert McNamara may be the prototype). When a social system is caught in the unpredictable process of crisis

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[30]The term neurocrat describes a person with an internalized personality conflict which is managed profitably by segmenting and attaching the conflictual elements to conflicting requirements of the executive role. Conflicts of this type are obviously highest during periods of transition, and logically, they increase with development. They become especially violent when the ideology of one period clashes sharply with that of the next. The nationalism of the period of solidarity fits nicely into the requirements of the stage of accelerated adaptation. However, the social darwinism that evolves during this stage clashes bitterly with the concepts of welfarism prevalent during the period of distributive integration. The neurocrat, especially from the upper class, is particularly well-fitted for leadership during this period. See Eugene Jennings, The Executive: Autocrat, Bureaucrat, and Democrat (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), Chapter 8.

(war, depression, natural disaster), crisis leaders emerge. They tend to be charismatic, autocratic and claim expertise in the crisis they are about to engage (Churchill, Roosevelt, Hitler).